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Abstract. We generalize a concept of classical finite extensive game to make it useful
for application of quantum objects. The generalization extends a quantum realization
scheme of static games to any finite extensive game. It represents an extension of
any classical finite extensive games to the quantum domain. In addition our model is
compatible with well-known quantum schemes of static games. The paper is summed
up by two examples.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a
1. Introduction
The quantum game theory is based on the combination of game theory and quantum
information. From the mathematical point of view an arena of a quantum game is
a tensor product of multidimensional Hilbert spaces where unitary operators acting on
fixed vectors from these spaces are treated as actions taken by players [2]. The paper
[1] deserves the special attention. In this paper the authors introduce the model of
a quantum realization of any static 2×2 game. Another important paper is [5] where
the authors show an alternative model of a quantum static game. Quantum game theory
goes beyond static games. Among recent papers there can be found problems of duopoly,
poker games, repeated games, etc., played in the quantum domain. Motivation for our
research has been a scientific niche that remains in an area of quantum extensive games.
Our paper is entirely dedicated to this topic entirely.
We decided to remind in next section basic notions of game theory which will be
necessary in the sequel. Readers who are not familiar with game theory are encouraged
to consult [6] and [12]. Necessary elements of quantum information can be found in [4]
and [11].
2. Preliminaries of game theory
This section starts with defining a game in an extensive form. In all cases when we refer
to the concept of the game, we have in mind finite games that is, games with finite set
of strategies for each player.
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Quantum realization of extensive games 2
Definition 2.1 [12] Let the following components be given:
(i) A finite set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of players.
(ii) A set H of finite sequences that satisfies the following two properties:
(a) The empty sequence ∅ is a member of H.
(b) If (ak)k=1,2,...,K ∈ H and L < K then (ak)k=1,2,...,L ∈ H.
Each member of H is a history and each component of a history is an action taken
by a player. A history (a1, a2, . . . , aK) ∈ H is terminal if there is no aK+1 such
that (a1, a2, . . . , aK , aK+1) ∈ H. The set of actions available after the nonterminal
history h is denoted A(h) = {a: (h, a) ∈ H} and the set of terminal histories is
denoted T .
(iii) The player function P :H \ T → N ∪ c that points to a player who takes an action
after the history h. If P (h) = c then chance (the chance-mover) determines the
action taken after the history h.
(iv) A function fc that associates with each history h for which P (h) = c an independent
probability distribution fc(·|h) on A(h).
(v) For each player i ∈ N a partition Ii of {h ∈ H \ T : P (h) = i} with the property
that for each Ii ∈ Ii and for each h, h′ ∈ Ii an equality A(h) = A(h′) is fulfilled.
The extensive game form is a tuple (N,H, P, fc, {Ii}i∈N).
Each element Ii of the partition Ii is called an information set for a player i. The
partition of set H \ T into the information sets corresponds to the state of players’
knowledge. A player who makes move after certain history h belonging to an information
set from Ii, knows that the current course of the game takes the form of one of histories
being part of Ii ∈ Ii. She does not know, however, if it is the history h or the other
history from Ii.
The complete description of a game also requires a utility function for each player i
to be defined. The full description of this function can be found in [6] and [12]. For
our purpose it suffices to understand the utility function as a function assigning a real
number to each terminal history. This number reflects preference of the i-th player with
respect to particular terminal history.
Definition 2.2 [12] The extensive game form together with a collection {ui: i ∈ N}
of utility functions ui:T → R is called the extensive game.
Although an extensive game from definition 2.2 describes every extensive game, our
deliberations focus on games with perfect recall - this means games in which at each
stage every player remembers all the information that she knew earlier and all of her
own past moves. Further in the article if there is need to depict utility values (payoffs)
for all players, we shall consider the utility function as function u : T → Rn defined as
u(h) = (ui(h))i=1,2,...,n.
A game as a mathematical model can be described in algebraic language, thereby
including a concept of isomorphism. Static game is defined only by a set of players
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N , collection of sets of strategies {Si}i∈N and a utility function u:
∏n
i=1 Si → Rn. For
this reason games: (N, {Si}i∈N , u) and (N, {S ′i}i∈N , u′) are isomorphic iff there exists
bijection ζ:
∏n
i=1 Si →
∏n
i=1 S
′
i such that u(s) = u
′(ζ(s)). The players who are taking
part in some game cannot notice that they are playing indeed some of its isomorphic
equivalents. Contrary to static games, the notion of isomorphism of extensive games is
more complex.
Definition 2.3 The games in the form of tuples (N,H, P, fc, {Ii}i∈N , {ui}i∈N) and
(N ′, H ′, P ′, f ′c, {I ′i}i∈N , {u′i}i∈N) are called isomorphic, if there exists a bijective function
ξ:H → H ′ that satisfies following conditions:
(i) ξ(∅) = ∅′
(ii) ∀h∈H\T (ξ(h, a) = (h′, a′)⇒ ξ(h) = h′),
(iii) ∀h∈H\T P (h) = P ′(ξ(h))
(iv) ∀h:P (h)=c fc(·|h) = f ′c(·|ξ(h)),
(v) ∀i∈N∀Ii∈Ii ξ(Ii) = I ′i,
(vi) ∀h∈T∀i∈N ui(h) = u′i(ξ(h)).
We realize that the above defined notion of isomorphic games contains very restrictive
conditions. According to the definition mentioned above, isomorphic games differ only
by marks of all their components. The case of two games in which one of them will be
modified by addition only one action a1 of some player to the beginning history ∅ so
that A(∅) = {a1}, does not satisfy the conditions of Definition 2.3.
The notions: action and strategy mean the same in static games, because the players
choose their actions once and simultaneously. In the majority of extensive games players
can make their decision about an action depending on all the actions taken previously
by themselves and also by all the other players. In other words, players can have some
plans of actions at their disposal such that these plans point out to a specific action
depending on the course of a game. Such a plan is defined as a (pure) strategy in an
extensive game.
Definition 2.4 [12] A strategy si of player i in a game (N,H, P, fc, {Ii}i∈N , u) is
a function that assigns an action in A(Ii) to each information set Ii ∈ I.
A sequence of strategies of all players s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) is called a profile of the
strategies. Each profile s determines unambiguously (if the chance mover has been
excluded) some terminal history and each of its subhistories. However, for a fixed
history h there may exist a lot of strategies’ profiles which generate h. Generally:
Definition 2.5 [12] A strategy si of a player i is consistent with some history
h = (a1, a2, . . . , ak) if for every (strict) subhistory (a1, a2, . . . , al) of h for which
P (a1, a2, . . . , al) = i the condition si(a1, a2, . . . , al) = al+1 is fulfilled. We define a profile
s = (si)i=1,2,...,n to be consistent with h iff for every player i, si is consistent with h.
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Definitions 2.4 and 2.5 imply that any extensive game defined by Definition 2.2 induces
some static (strategic) game (N, {Si}i∈N , u). Then for each i ∈ N a set Si is the set of
all possible functions defined by Definition 2.4. The utility function u is the same as
the one in the extensive game but is redefined from a domain T to the domain
∏n
i=1 Si
using the notion defined in Definition 2.5. It follows that notions assigned to static
games are used in extensive games. One of these most important notions is a notion of
an equilibrium introduced by John Nash in [7]:
Definition 2.6 Let mark by (N,Si, {ui}i∈N) a strategic form of an extensive game with
perfect recall. A profile of strategies (s∗1, s
∗
2, . . . , s
∗
n) is a Nash equilibrium if for each
player i ∈ N :
ui(s
∗
1, s
∗
2, . . . , s
∗
n) > ui(s∗1, s∗2, . . . , s∗i−1, si, s∗i+1, . . . , s∗n) for all si ∈ Si. (1)
Inequality (1) means that Nash equilibrium is a profile where the strategy of each player
is optimal if we accept the choice of its opponents to be fixed. In the equilibrium none
of the players has any reason to unilaterally deviate from an equilibrium strategy.
3. Eisert’s generalized scheme for two-person static quantum game
The quantum model described in this paper comes originally from [1], but we will
describe its general version based on [10], with a little change of a space’s base however.
Quantization of a two-person static game begins with preparation of an initial state
described by a vector from the space C2⊗C2 with a standard base {|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉}:
|Ψ〉 = cos γ
2
|00〉+ i sin γ
2
|11〉 for γ ∈ [0, pi]. (2)
Each of the players has at his disposal a set of unitary operators depending on two
parameters θ and φ of the form:
Uj = cos
θj
2
Jj + sin
θj
2
Cj for θj ∈ [0, pi], (3)
where Jj and Cj are defined as follows:
Jj|0〉 = eiφj |0〉, Jj|1〉 = e−iφj |1〉 for φj ∈ [0, pi
2
];
Cj|0〉 = −|1〉, Cj|1〉 = |0〉 and j = 1, 2. (4)
Operators (3) are treated as actions taken in the game where players act, respectively,
on the first and the second qubit in the initial state (2):
|Ψfin〉 = (U1 ⊗ U2)|Ψ〉. (5)
In accordance with formulas (2) to (4), the state (5) takes form:
|Ψfin〉 = χ00|00〉+ χ01|01〉+ χ10|10〉+ χ11|11〉, (6)
where elements χkl are specified by equalities:
χ00 = e
i(φ1+φ2) cos
γ
2
cos
θ1
2
cos
θ2
2
+ i sin
γ
2
sin
θ1
2
sin
θ2
2
;
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χ01 = − eiφ1 cos γ
2
cos
θ1
2
sin
θ2
2
+ ie−iφ2 sin
γ
2
sin
θ1
2
cos
θ2
2
;
χ10 = − eiφ2 cos γ
2
sin
θ1
2
cos
θ2
2
+ ie−iφ1 sin
γ
2
cos
θ1
2
sin
θ2
2
;
χ11 = cos
γ
2
sin
θ1
2
sin
θ2
2
+ ie−i(φ1+φ2) sin
γ
2
cos
θ1
2
cos
θ2
2
. (7)
The utility function for the players is defined by operator:
X = ∆00|00〉〈00|+ ∆01|01〉〈01|+ ∆10|10〉〈10|+ ∆11|11〉〈11|, (8)
where each element ∆kl is a two-dimensional payoff vector with real value entries defined
by an ‘original’ game. If a quantum state (5) is presented in the form of density matrix
ρfin = |Ψfin〉〈Ψfin| payoffs that players gain are expressed by the following formula:
pi((θ1, φ1), (θ2, φ2)) = Tr(Xρfin), (9)
which by using equalities (6) to (8), can be expressed as:
pi((θ1, φ1), (θ2, φ2)) =
∑
k,l∈{0,1}
∆kl|χkl|2. (10)
4. Quantum realization of extensive game
In this section we define an extensive game played with the use of quantum objects
(qudits). To simplify the idea we restricted our consideration to games without the
chance-mover (typically called Nature). However in further part of the paper we will
point out how to extend our scheme to games with action taken by Nature.
Let us assume that we have m various quantum system, each described with the
use of a space Cdj spanned by the orthonormal base Bdj = {|0〉, |1〉, . . . , |dj − 1〉} for
j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Furthermore, let’s consider an initial quantum state of a composite
system described by a unit vector |Ψ〉 from the tensor product Cd1 ⊗ Cd2 ⊗ . . . ⊗ Cdm
with the base {|ν1〉 ⊗ |ν2〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |νm〉 : |νj〉 ∈ Bdj}. The vector |Ψ〉 takes the form:
|Ψ〉 =
d1−1∑
ν1=0
d2−1∑
ν2=0
. . .
dm−1∑
νm=0
αν1,ν2,...,νm|ν1, ν2, . . . , νm〉. (11)
Additionally, let’s mark by:
(i) {U1,U2, . . . ,Um} a collection of sets of unitary operators. Each set Uj is a subset of
the set SU(dj) including dj operators V0, V1, . . . , Vdj−1 defined as follows:
Vt|νj〉 = eiφt |νj ⊕ t〉 for any t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , dj − 1}, (12)
where |νj〉 ∈ Bdj , eiφt is some phase factor and ⊕ means addition modulo dj.
(ii) {Mνj} a collection of operators that provides the description of quantum
measurements. An operator Mνj for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m and νj = 0, 1, . . . , dj − 1 is
expressed by the formula:
Mνj = I
⊗j−1 ⊗ |νj〉〈νj| ⊗ I⊗m−j. (13)
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The measurement operator Mνj defines measurement outcome νj on a single qudit j
composing (11).
Let us assume abbreviated notation {Uj, νj} for a unitary operation Uj ∈ Uj carried
out on j-th qudit:
I⊗j−1 ⊗ Uj ⊗ I⊗m−j|Ψ〉 = |ΨUj〉, (14)
and a measurement outcome νj obtained after measurement on this qudit. In accordance
with von Neumann measurements the post-measurement state |Ψ{Uj ,νj}〉 is
Mνj |ΨUj〉√〈ΨUj |Mνj |ΨUj〉 with probability Pr(νj) = 〈ΨUj |Mνj |ΨUj〉. (15)
When there is no need to detail both of components from couple {Uj, νj} we will
write merely qj
.
= {Uj, νj} to denote that a unitary operation Uj and a measurement
yielding the result νj are performed on qudit j. We define in a recurrent way a (finite)
sequence (qj1 , qj2 , . . . , qjλ) of operations on qudits j1, j2, . . . , jλ. Here, each element qjκ is
a couple {Ujκ , νjκ} of operations of the initial state (11) when the sequence of operations
(qj1 , qj2 , . . . , qjκ−1) on this state has occurred.
Given that a unitary operation Uj has been chosen, a probability Pr ({Uj, νj}) that
couple {Uj, νj} occurs is independent of operation taken by the other players on their
own qudits. Therefore, following the recurrent expression of a sequence (qjκ)κ=1,2,...,λ we
define the probability to be Pr((qjκ)κ=1,2,...,λ)) ≡
∏λ
κ=1 Pr(νjκ).
4.1. Quantum extensive game form
Let mark by `6m the set of all possible subsequences (qjκ)κ=1,2,...,λ of sequences of the
form (q1, q2, . . . , qm). Let define the collection in the power set P(`6m):
L =
{
[(νjκ)κ=1,2,...,λ]:
(jκ)κ=1,2,...,λ is a subsequence of (j)j=1,2,...,m
νjκ ∈ {0, 1, . . . , djκ − 1}
}
, (16)
where each set of the form [(νjκ)κ=1,2,...,λ] consists of all sequences of operations
(qjκ)κ=1,2,...,λ on which the sequence of measurement outcomes (νjκ)κ=1,2,...,λ has occurred.
Notice that L is a collection of pairwise disjoint sets and equal to `6m in total. Moreover,
every set [(νjκ)] is nonempty (as unitary operations include operations of the form (12)).
It entails that L is a partition of `6m. The partition determines unique equivalence
relation for which every set [(νjκ)] is an equivalence class. An extensive game played on
qudits is the game played according to scenario from Definitions 2.1 and 2.2 except that
it is expressed in the language of classes from L:
Definition 4.1 Quantum extensive game form consists of the following components:
(i) A finite set of players N = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
(ii) An initial state |Ψ〉 ∈ Cd1 ⊗ Cd2 ⊗ . . .⊗ Cdm and m > n.
(iii) A collection {U1,U2, . . . ,Um} of sets of unitary operators.
(iv) A subcollecton H ⊂ {∅,L} that fulfils the following three properties:
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(a) ∅ ∈ H,
(b) if [(νjκ)κ=1,2,...,λ] ∈ H then for any number ι ∈ {1, 2, . . . , λ} it implies that
{[(νjκ)κ=1,2,...,ι]: νjι = 0, 1, . . . , djι − 1} ⊂ H
(c) if [(νjκ)κ=1,2,...,λ] ∈ H and j′ 6= jλ then [(νj1 , νj2 , . . . , νjλ−1 , νj′)] /∈ H.
Each sequence (qjκ) from a set
⋃
(H) (i.e. a set of all sequences of H) is called
a history. The set ∅ is the initial history for which it is assumed Pr(∅) = 1.
A history (qjκ) ∈ [(νjκ)jκ=1,2,...,jλ ] (a class [(νjκ)jκ=1,2,...,jλ ]) is terminal if there
is no number j′ such that [(νj1 , νj2 , . . . , νjλ , νj′)] ∈ H. The collection of all
terminal classes will be denoted T . A partition of a collection H into terminal and
nonterminal classes defines a map A˜ on
⋃
(H \ T ) such that A˜ ([(νjκ)κ=1,2,...,λ]) =
{qjλ+1}. A set of unitary operators Ujλ+1 defined by a couple qjλ+1 is a set of available
actions to a player whose turn is next after history from [(νjκ)κ=1,2,...,λ]. Each
measurement outcome νjλ+1 corresponding to an individual base state from Bdjλ+1
is treated as an outcome of some action Ujλ+1 ∈ Ujλ+1.
(v) A player function P˜ :
⋃
(H \ T ) → N with the property that a set P˜ ([(νjκ)]) is
a singleton for every class [(νjκ)] ∈ H\T . It points at a player who takes an action
when a history from class [(νjκ)] has happened. A function P˜ together with a map
A˜ defines for each player i a partition of collection H\ T into information sets J ji
that take the form {[(νjκ)] ∈ H \ T : P˜ ([(νjκ)]) = {i} ∧ A˜([(νjκ)]) = {qj}}.
The quantum extensive game form (N, |Ψ〉, {Uj},H, P˜ ) and the classical extensive game
form are almost identical with accuracy of components’ nature that they make up both
the forms. The notion of player i’s strategy in the extensive game also adapts for the
quantum case in natural way, i.e. it is a map that assigns a unitary operator associated
with a couple A˜(J ji ) to each information set. In other words, a strategy of player
i determines exactly one operation on each of qudits that are available for a player
i. There is a deep difference in a structure of a history though. In normal extensive
games actions taken by players unambiguously determine some history. In the quantum
case a sequence (being a history in quantum game) in which every element consists of
a unitary operation on quantum object and then a measurement on it, forms a history.
It implies that on the one hand there are more than one sequence of a unitary operation
that correspond to the same sequence of measurement outcomes. On the other hand as
a rule a given sequence of unitary operations and a measurement performed on arbitrary
qudits do not unambiguously sequences of measurement outcomes. So now, to formulate
anew the notion presented in Definition 2.5, we define a strategy si of player i to be
consistent with a history (qj1 , qj2 , . . . , qjλ) if for every subhistory (qj1 , qj2 , . . . , qjκ) for
which P (qj1 , qj2 , . . . , qjκ) = i we have qjκ+1 = {si(qj1 , qj2 , . . . , qjκ), νjκ+1}. The notion
formulated in this way implies that if a profile strategy s is given then there are more
than one sequence (qjκ) that s is consistent with (qjκ). The set of all these sequences
consists of all sequences in which unitary operation are determined by the profile s.
In a tuple (N,H, P, fc, {Ii}i∈N) which describes in an explicit way some some
extensive game, a partition into information sets {Ii}i∈N can be omitted. It suffices
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to include in set H description information indicating which of nonterminal histories
h ∈ H implicate the same set of action A(h) (e.g. through applying appropriate
indices). The component H of a tuple (N, |Ψ〉, {Uj},H, P˜ ) specifies all the histories
which are predecessors of an operation on the same qudit of initial state |Ψ〉, hence the
lack of elements Ji in the tuple. Notice more that contrary to a classic extensive game
the smallest information set consists of one history. In the quantum extensive form the
smallest information set is composed of all the sequences in which the same sequence of
outcomes has occurred.
The scheme can be widened by the special player called Nature. For instance, let
us assume that after each of certain class of histories a move of the Nature occurs and
the number of her possible alternatives is dc. Then an initial state characterizing so
modified game is in the form of |Ψ〉 ⊗ |ψ〉 ∈⊗mj=1Cdj ⊗ Cdc . A measurement of qudit
|ψ〉 generates independent probability distribution and a measurement outcome of this
qudit represents an ‘action’ of Nature.
4.2. Utility function
The means of defining preferences of players in our scheme are based on the well-known
structure including [2] and [5].
Let (N, |Ψ〉, {Uj},H, P˜ , ) be a quantum extensive form and assign each class
[(νjκ)κ=1,2,...,λ] from T with a projector
M[(νjκ )] =
∑
νj :j /∈{j1,j2,...,jλ}
|ν1, ν2, . . . , νm〉〈ν1, ν2, . . . , νm|. (17)
Similarly to the scheme of quantum static games from the third section we define a payoff
operator as
Xe =
∑
[(νjκ )]∈T
∆[(νjκ )]M[(νjκ )], (18)
where ∆[(νjκ )] = (δ1, δ2, . . . , δn) is an element of R
n and each coordinate δi means a utility
payoff for i-th player. Let ρ(qjκ ) denote the density matrix of the initial state |Ψ〉 given
that a sequence (qjκ) ∈
⋃
(T ) on state |Ψ〉 has occurred. Then u˜(qjκ) = Tr(Xeρ(qjκ )). In
the quantum extensive game an expression Tr(Xeρ(qjκ )) turns out to be more simplified.
Suppose that [(νακ)κ=1,2,...,λ] and [(ν
′
βκ
)κ=1,2,...,λ′ ] are disjoint terminal classes from T .
Let M[(νακ )] and M[(ν′βκ )] be the projectors (17) that correspond to these classes. Let us
estimate the product M[(νακ )]M[(ν′βκ )]. It will be the zero operator if M[(νακ )] and M[(ν
′
βκ
)]
do not have any element |ν1, ν2, . . . , νm〉〈ν1, ν2, . . . , νm| in common. The condition (c)
of Definition 4.1 implies that an equality α1 = β1 must be true for any class [(νακ)] and
[(ν ′βκ)]. Now, if να1 6= ν ′α1 then M[(νακ )] and M[(ν′βκ )] vary in at least outcome of α1 and
it entails the product of 0. So, classes [(να1 , να2 , . . . , ναλ)] and [(να1 , ν
′
β2
, . . . , ν ′βλ′ )] only
remain to be pondered. Then again condition (c) ensures that α2 = β2 and the product
is equal 0 for sure until να2 6= ν ′α2 . By repeating the reasoning over and over again we
will come to the conclusion that M[(νακ )]M[(ν′βκ )] 6= 0 might be expected only if equalities
ακ = βκ and νακ = ν
′
βκ
will be true for all κ = 1, 2, . . . ,min {λ, λ′}. However, the chosen
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classes become the same for λ = λ′. On the other hand λ 6= λ′ indicates that one of
these classes is not terminal. This contradiction of the way that classes [(νακ)κ=1,2,...,λ]
and [(ν ′βκ)κ=1,2,...,λ′ ] were defined implies that for every classes belonging to T an equality
M[(νακ )]M[(ν′βκ )] = 0 is true. Because any (qjκ) ∈ [(νjκ)] is characterized as the sequence
of operation that outcomes (νjκ) has occurred it follows that:
Tr(M[(ν′βκ )]ρ(qjκ )) =
{
1, if [(ν ′βκ)] = [(νjκ)];
0, if else.
(19)
By replacing M[(ν′βκ )] with the payoff operator Xe in (19) it leads to convenient
representation of u˜ as:
u˜:
⋃
(T )→ Rn, ∀(qjκ )∈[(νjκ )] u˜(qjκ) = ∆[(νjκ )]. (20)
4.3. Quantum extensive game
The results of previous subsection allow to note:
Definition 4.2 A quantum extensive game form (N, |Ψ〉, {Uj},H, P˜ ) together with
determined utility function (20) is called a quantum extensive game.
Now, when we have full description of extensive game played on qudits we remark upon
a role of measurement in these games. In games played classically it is obvious that an
event that we have just observed after an action taken by a player will be agree with
that action. It also will happen if we put into our scheme an initial state of the form
eiϕ|ν1, ν2, . . . , νm〉 simultaneously with the set of unitary operators for all the players
defined by the equation (12). These components define a game that after a move of
each player there is only one measurement outcome that could be observed. Then
expected utility values for the all players would be one of the vectors ∆[·]. Notice more
that the game is in essence an extensive game by Definition 2.2. However, in general
case of the quantum game there are more than one outcome that could be measured on
qudit after an action of each player. This feature formulates the expected utility value
as a convex combination of vectors ∆[·] in which coefficients are Pr(·):
u˜(s) =
∑
(qjκ )|s∈
⋃
(T )
Pr((qjκ)|s)u˜((qjκ)|s). (21)
where (qjκ)|s denotes a history consistent with profile s.
In the process of defining the scheme there was no need to relate the quantum
extensive game to an extensive game drawn from Definition 2.2 so far. It point out that
both of these notions are independent of each other, at least in respect of hints needed
to playing this game. However, in order to consider any connections between classic and
quantum games it is necessarily to ascribe the set of all of quantum extensive games
to those which are quantum realization of fixed classic game. Our idea coincides with
the conception based on papers [1] and [5] which involves identification of each outcome
of a classical static game with exactly one measurement outcome of quantum system
provided for a quantum game. Thus with regard to our scheme for (|Ψ〉, N, {Uj},H, P˜ )
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to become a quantum realization of (N,H, P, {Ii}i∈N , u) it is necessary for components
H and H to be isomorphic. Furthermore, player functions and utility functions of these
games should be the same for respective arguments.
To specify the thought for a given (N, |Ψ〉, {Uj},H, P˜ , u˜) let us consider an arbitrary
set C(H) of class representatives (qjκ)|[(νjκ)] of all classes [(νjκ)] from H that satisfies
conditions i) to iii) of Definition 4.1. Then a tuple (N,C(H), P˜ , u˜) is an extensive
game with respect to Definition 2.2. Moreover, each of these games does not depend
on the choice of a set C(H). In fact, for any sets C(H), C ′(H) of class representatives,
games: (N,C(H), P˜ , u˜) and (N,C ′(H), P˜ , u˜) are isomorphic via an arbitrary one-to-one
mapping ξ:C(H)→ C ′(H) with the property that the image of any class representative
(qjκ)|[(νjκ)] is a class representative of the same class [(νjκ)]. Taking an advantage of
the above analysis, notion of quantum realization of game can be defined as follows:
Definition 4.3 Let an extensive game Γ = (N,H, P, {Ii}i∈N , u) be given. Every
game (N, |Ψ〉, {Uj},H, P˜ , u˜) such that (N,C(H), P˜ , u˜) and Γ are isomorphic is called
a quantum realization of Γ.
From the above definition we can observe that (taking both the shape of a strategic and
an extensive one) has infinitely many quantum realizations differing from each other
by a given initial state and (or) unitary operations available to players. On the other
hand the quantum game is the realization of exactly one classic game (to an accuracy of
isomorphism). Notice that the well-known quantum realization of the Prisoner Dilemma
([2], [10]) or the Battle of the Sexes ([3], [5], [8]) are the examples of the notion of
quantum realization that has been expressed by Definition 4.3.
5. Examples of quantum extensive games
First, we will learn that our scheme of playing extensive games agree with the scheme
described in the second section. A possibility of such test results from the fact that
every static game (a game in which players make their moves at the same time) can be
depicted in an extensive form. In particular if a two-player static game in which each of
the players has a two-element action set is given respectively: player 1 has A = {a0, a1},
player 2 has B = {b0, b1} then one of the extensive form of this game is following:
Γ1 = ({1, 2}, H, P, (Ii)i∈{1,2}, u) (22)
in which the components are defined as follows:
(i) H = {∅, (a0), (a1), (a0, b0), (a0, b1), (a1, b0), (a1, b1)},
(ii) P : {∅, (a0), (a1)} → {1, 2}, P (∅) = 1, P (a0) = P (a1) = 2,
(iii) I1 = {∅}, I2 = {(a0), (a1)},
(iv) u: {(ak, bl)}k,l∈{0,1} → R2, u(ak, bl) = ∆kl.
The static game and its equivalent in extensive form are presented in the left-hand
side of Figure 1. In the extensive game player 1 moves first (or vice versa). After
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Figure 1. Static game (a), its equivalent in the extensive form (b) and the quantum
realization of these game (c). In the quantum realization each of players chooses among
continuum of actions specifying φ i θ. The range of possibilities corresponds to two
edges J i C connected with an arc.
that according to the player function player 2 acts. Since information set I2 of player
2 (a dotted line) encapsulates both of the previous player’s actions, this player knows
only that it is his turn to make move na without information which of the two possible
histories has occurred in fact. This situation can therefore be treated as when both the
players carry out their actions at the same time, as it happens in static games. Assuming
that the respective outcomes of both the games correspond to the same payoff values,
players’ decisions about their actions are indifferent to what of the game they actually
play. So, if a static game and its extensive version are given and a scheme of quantum
static games is correct, the players should be indifferent to whether they are playing the
quantum static game or the quantum extensive version. The example below shows that
the mentioned property embedded into our scheme.
Example 5.1 Let us consider the following quantum extensive game:
QΓ1 = ({1, 2}, |Ψ〉, {U1,U2},H, P˜ , u˜) (23)
defined by the components:
(i) |Ψ〉 is in the form of (2),
(ii) Uj is a set of unitary operations defined by (3) i (4),
(iii) H = {∅, [(01)], [(11)], [(01, 02)], [(01, 12)], [(11, 02)], [(11, 12)]},
(iv) P˜ : {∅, [(01)], [(11)]} → {1, 2}, P˜ (∅) = 1, P˜ ([(01)]) = P˜ ([(11)]) = {2},
(v) u˜:
⋃
({[(ν1, ν2)]: (ν1, ν2) ∈ {0, 1}2})→ R2, u˜ (
⋃
([(ν1, ν2)])) = {∆ν1ν2}.
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The game QΓ1 is depicted in the right-hand side of Figure 1. Game (N,C(H), P˜ , u˜)
generated by QΓ1 and game (22) are isomorphic via a bijective map ξ:H → C(H)
presented as:
ξ(h) =

∅, if h = ∅;
q1|[(ν1)], if h = (aν1);
(q1, q2)|[(ν1, ν2)], if h = (aν1 , bν1).
(24)
According to Definition 4.3 game QΓ1 is a quantum realization of game Γ1. Let find out
course of the game for an arbitrary strategy profile s = (s1, s2) and then an outcome
corresponds to s.
Each of the players have only one information set, respectively, J1 = {∅} and
J2 = {[(01)], [(11)]}. It implies that profile (s1, s2) is tantamount with action profile
(U1, U2) where Uj ∈ Uj. As the components of QΓ1 dictate, the game starts with
unitary operation U1 that player 1 acts on a first qubit of initial state |Ψ〉:
|ΨU1〉 = cos
γ
2
(
eiφ1 cos
θ1
2
|0〉 − sin θ1
2
|1〉
)
⊗ |0〉
+ sin
γ
2
(
sin
θ1
2
|0〉+ e−iφ1 cos θ1
2
|1〉
)
⊗ |1〉. (25)
Then a measurement on this qubit is preparing. If M01 = |0〉〈0|⊗I then the probability
of obtaining on the first qubit the outcome 01 and the state |ΨU1〉 after the measurement
are:
Pr(01) = cos
2 γ
2
cos2
θ1
2
+ sin2
γ
2
sin2
θ1
2
,
|Ψ{U1,01}〉 =
1√
Pr(01)
(
eiφ1 cos
γ
2
cos
θ1
2
|00〉+ i sin γ
2
sin
θ1
2
|01〉
)
. (26)
An analogous calculation for M11 = |1〉〈1| ⊗ I give:
Pr(11) = cos
2 γ
2
sin2
θ1
2
+ sin2
γ
2
cos2
θ1
2
,
|Ψ{U1,11}〉 =
1√
Pr(11)
(
− cos γ
2
sin
θ1
2
|10〉+ ie−iφ1 sin γ
2
cos
θ1
2
|11〉
)
. (27)
After each of histories {U1, 01} and {U1, 11} it is the player 2 turn now. All histories
after which the second player make move, belong to her information set. It follows that,
she performs an operation U2 on the second qubit regardless of a measurement outcome
on the first qubit. If a couple {U1, 01} occurred, the state becomes:
|Ψ{U1,01},U2〉 =
1√
Pr(01)
(
eiφ1 cos
γ
2
cos
θ1
2
|0〉 ⊗
(
eiφ2 cos
θ2
2
|0〉 − sin θ2
2
|1〉
)
+ i sin
γ
2
sin
θ1
2
|0〉 ⊗
(
sin
θ2
2
|0〉+ e−iφ2 cos θ2
2
|1〉
))
. (28)
By use of equations (7) expression (28) can be rewritten in the form:
|Ψ{U1,01},U2〉 =
χ00|00〉+ χ01|01〉√
Pr(01)
. (29)
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The probability of getting outcome ν2 ∈ {0, 1} and the post-measurement state given
that outcome ν2 occurred are
Pr(ν2) =
|χ0ν2|2
Pr(01)
, |Ψ{U1,01},{U2,ν2}〉 =
χ0ν2|0ν2〉√
Pr(01)
. (30)
In case if history {U1, 11} has occurred we get
Pr(ν2) =
|χ1ν2|2
Pr(11)
, |Ψ{U1,11},{U2,ν2}〉 =
χ1ν2|1ν2〉√
Pr(11)
. (31)
Let determine a payoff vector correspond to U = (U1, U2). Notice first that a set of all
terminal histories consistent with (U1, U2) is made up of four histories at most. The
form of this set is
{(q1, q2)|U} = {({U1, ν1}, {U2, ν2}): (ν1, ν2) ∈ {0, 1}2}. (32)
The probability distribution Pr(·) on the set (32) are expressed by the formula
Pr({U1, ν1}, {U2, ν2}) = |χν1ν2|2 through (25) to (31) and the utility function u˜ defined
on the same domain takes values u˜({U1, ν1}, {U2, ν2}) = ∆ν1ν2 . Substituting the last
calculations to the formula (21) the expected payoffs for the players is as follows:
u˜(U) =
∑
(ν1,ν2)∈{0,1}2
|χν1ν2|2∆ν1ν2 . (33)
The utility payoffs assigned to (U1, U2) are the same as the one in Eisert’s et al scheme.
Example 5.2 Let us consider a three player extensive game given in Figure 2:
Γ2 = ({1, 2, 3}, H, P, (Ii)i∈{1,2,3}, u) (34)
determined by the following components:
(i) H = {∅, (a0), (a1), (a0, c0), (a0, c1), (a1, b0), (a1, b1), (a1, b0, c0), (a1, b0, c1)},
(ii) P (∅) = 1, P (a1) = 2, P (a0) = P (a1, b0) = 3,
(iii) I1 = {∅}, I2 = {(a1)}, I3 = {(a0), (a1, b0)},
(iv) u(a0, c0) = (3, 3, 1), u(a0, c1) = (0, 0, 0), u(a1, b1) = (2, 2, 2), u(a1, b0, c0) = (5, 5, 0),
u(a1, b0, c1) = (0, 0, 1).
It is a modified Selten’s Horse game towards the payoffs. Profiles: (a0, b1, c0) and
(a1, b1, c1) are Nash equilibria in this game and each of them could be equally likely
as a scenario of the game indeed. The payoff for players 1 i 2 assigned to (a0, b1, c0) is
more beneficial than the outcome corresponding to (a1, b1, c1) that is desirable for player
3. The uncertainty of a result of the game follows from the peculiar strategic position of
player 3. She could try to affect decision the others through her announcement before
the game starts that she is going to put action c1. Then, under the preference of the
others players the history (a1, b1) should occur given that the statement of player 3 is
credible enough.
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player 1 player 2
player 3
a0
a1
b0
b1
c1c0 c1c0
Figure 2. The modified Selten’s Horse game defined by Γ2
There are games among the quantum realizations of game Γ2 that have unique Nash
equilibrium and that profile would be treated as reasonable profile for players. One of
these games is shown below.
QΓ2 = ({1, 2, 3}, |Ψ〉, {U1,U2,U3},H, P˜ , u˜) (35)
with initial state:
|Ψ〉 = cos γ
2
|000〉+ i sin γ
2
|111〉, dla γ ∈ (0, pi) (36)
and the other components:
(i) Uj = {V0, V1} are defined by formula (12),
(ii) H = {∅, [(01)], [(11)], [(01, 03)], [(01, 13)], [(11, 02)], [(11, 12)], [(11, 02, 03)], [(11, 02, 13)]},
(iii) P˜ (∅) = 1, P˜ ([(11)]) = {2}, P˜ ([(01)]) = P˜ ([(11, 02)]) = {3},
(iv) u˜([(11, 02, 03)]) = {(5, 5, 0)}, u˜([(11, 02, 13)]) = {(0, 0, 1)}, u˜([(11, 12]) = {(2, 2, 2)},
u˜([(01, 03)]) = {(3, 3, 1)}, u˜([(01, 13)]) = {(0, 0, 0)}.
A convenient representation of this game is shown in Figure 3. Notice first that when
player 1 has moved and a couple {Vt, ν1} has occurred the other players will be only
playing in the ‘classical’ game. It follow form a fact that after an action of player 1 (she
can only apply an identity and spin-flip operator) and after the measurement the state
ρ of the system collapses to one of the form |ν1ν2ν3〉〈ν1ν2ν3|. Now, each of the others
players acting via Vt on her own qubit j can get outcome 0j or 1j with probability
equals 1. Just the same as in games from Example 5.1 here each of the players has
a one information set so a set {V0, V1} is the set of their strategies. We shall focus on
analyze which of profiles V of these strategies are Nash equilibria. At first it necessary
to determine expected utility value of each possible profile of strategies. As an example
we will find the expected payoff for profile (V0, V1, V0). This profile is consistent with
two terminal histories: ({V0, 01}, {V0, 03}) and ({V0, 11}, {V1, 02}, {V0, 13}). To see this,
notice that strategy V0 of player 1 is consistent with history ({V0, 01}) and ({V0, 11}).
If history ({V0, 01}) has happened then ρ({V0,01}) = |000〉〈000| and it is player 3’s turn.
Her own operation V0 from the profile sets the history ({V0, 01}, {V0, 03}). For this
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Figure 3. Quantum realization of QΓ2. The graph represents the set of all histories
that would occur after action chosen by player 1
reason probability Pr({V0, 01}, {V0, 03}) = Pr({V0, 01}) and therefore is equal cos2 γ2 .
In a similar way we could confirm that profile (V0, V1, V0) is consistent with terminal
history ({V0, 11}, {V1, 02}, {V0, 13}) that occur with probability equal sin2 γ2 . Finally by
formula (21) the expected utilities u˜(V0, V1, V0) amount to (3 cos
2 γ
2
, 3 cos2 γ
2
, 1). If all
value u˜(V ) are at our disposal then by making use of the inequality (1) it turns out that
only profiles of the form V (t) = (Vt, Vt, Vt), t = 0, 1 could be (pure) Nash equilibria.
Also, it can be concluded from the set of equations below:
u1(V (t))− u1(Vt⊕21, Vt, Vt) = −2 cos (tpi − γ),
u2(V (t))− u2(Vt, Vt⊕21, Vt) = 1− cos (tpi − γ),
u3(V (t))− u3(Vt, Vt, Vt⊕21) = (1 + cos (tpi − γ))/2.
(37)
that existence of the Nash equilibria depends on the angle γ. This relation can be
represented by:
NE(γ) =
{
V (1), if 0 < γ 6 pi/2;
V (0), if pi/2 6 γ < pi. (38)
The expected utilities for the players are u˜1(V (t)) = u˜2(V (t)) = (5 + cos (tpi − γ))/2,
u˜3(V (t)) = (3−cos (tpi − γ))/2. It can be see now that each player can gain from playing
game QΓ2. Assuming that one of the equilibria will be chosen in Γ2, players 1 and 2
can assure oneself 2 utility units and player 3 will get 1 unit for sure - all are strictly
less than utilities from u˜(V (t)) irrespective of what a value of γ will be. Notice more
that there is the unique equilibrium in game QΓ2 if just γ 6= pi/2 or in the case γ = pi/2
the same utilities are assigned to the both equilibria. It makes the profile V (t) to be
considered as reasonable pair of strategies for players to choose in QΓ2.
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6. Summary
Our proposal of quantum playing of extensive game constitutes an extension of schemes
included in papers [1] and [5] as well as their generalizations shown in [9] and [10]
in the way in which extensive games broaden static games. Quantum realization of
a static game carry out by means of scheme constructed in third section generates a
game whose set of possible outcomes coincides with the scope of outcomes that may
be obtained with the use of scheme for describing quantum static games. It is also a
natural assumption of a game theory to model of static game in its extensive shape in
such a way so that it does not affect the outcome of the game. The main aim of the
research was to defined a new scheme and present the concept on meaningful examples.
Therefore for clarity of dissertation we restricted to use of concept to only one basic
notion applied to analysis of games - notion of Nash equilibrium. In reality it is possible
to use a tool in form of an arbitrary equilibrium refinement dedicated to extensive game.
Moreover, the two examples that have been given could be substituted with much more
complicated dynamic games. The concept of quantum extensive game provides a broad
scope of possibilities regarding ways of analyzing these games and above all way of
drawing comparisons between a classic game and its quantum equivalent.
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